This article discusses a relatively neglected aspect of the peace negotiations which concluded the War of the Spanish Succession, the mission to Spain in 1712-1713 of Robert Sutton, lord Lexington. Lexington's primary object was to witness Philip V's renunciation in the presence of the Cortes of his claim to the French throne (and the registration by the Cortes of the claims to the Spanish succession of Philip's brothers). This was a remarkable development. The Cortes, which is largely regarded by historians of the period as almost irrelevant, therefore played an important part in the peace process at the insistence of the government of queen Anne. Having resolved the issue of the renunciations, Lexington also helped to negotiate the surrender of what remained of Spanish Italy -the island of Sicily -to Victor Amadeus II of Savoy -and played a part in the reconstruction of a British presence in a Spanish state in which the nueva planta was beginning to have an impact.
as part of the peace congress which convened at Utrecht from January 1712 onwards, the name of that city having become synonymous with the peacemaking at the end of that war 7 . However, Philip V's plenipotentiaries were not admitted to the congress until their master's fate -whether he was to keep Spain and the Indies or not-had been determined 8 , such that the formal conclusion of the treaty of peace between Philip and queen Anne in July 1713 for example followed months of negotiations there but also elsewhere. Before then, Philip negotiated either indirectly (through Louis XIV's ministers at Versailles or his plenipotentiaries at Utrecht), or directly, using his own ministers in London and in Madrid. This essay explores the largely neglected negotiations in Madrid in the twelve months between October 1712 and the November 1713 of queen Anne's representative in Madrid, the earl of Lexington, whose correspondence still survives in the series State Papers (Spain) in the National Archives and in the British Library, both in London 9 . Lexington's main purpose in visiting Madrid was to witness Philip V's renunciation of his claim to the French crown 10 , one of a series of renunciations by members of the house of Bourbon aimed equally at preventing a king of Spain becoming king of France and a king of France becoming king of Spain. In 1711 the death of Holy Roman Emperor Joseph I and the prospect of the archduke Charles -"Charles III"-succeeding his elder brother as both Emperor and heir to a vast Habsburg patrimony, effectively recreating the empire of Charles I/V had helped British ministers to justify their abandonment of the earlier allied war aim of "No Peace without Spain". However, anxiety about the prospect of a union of France and Spain remained and re-emerged as a major issue -following a number of deaths in the French royal family in 1711-12 which left only the two-year old future Louis XV standing between Philip V and the French throne by the spring of 1712
11 . The solution which occurred to queen Anne's ministers -that Philip renounce his claim on the French throne, that the Spanish succession be detailed in the peace treaty or treaties and that the Spanish states or Cortes also formally acknowledge this 12 -was not entirely novel, Louis XIV having renounced his own claims on the Spanish throne on his marriage with Philip 7 For a general account, cf. Pitt, H. G.: "The Pacification of Utrecht", in bromLey, J. S. (ed. IV's daughter, the Infanta in 1659. However, the suggestion, when it was first made by the British ministers in the spring of 1712 was initially rejected by the French Court on the grounds that the prince, in this case Philip, could not renounce his claim, which Torcy described as more of an obligation, the prince being called to the throne by what he called a "fundamental" law. Instead, Torcy noted that Carlos II's will had "wisely anticipated" and solved this problem by providing that if Philip inherited the French throne he must renounce that of Spain. He also noted that Philip V had already modified the law of succession in Spain, suggesting that this could be embodied in the peace treaty and newly authorised if necessary by the states, or Cortes of Spain 13 . However, in a very clear statement of what might be labelled "revolution principles" -i.e. those of the English "Glorious Revolution" of 1688, when the throne had been declared vacant following James II's flight to France (although the word abdication was carefully avoided) and the throne offered to James's daughter, Mary, and her husband prince William of Orange, henceforth William III 14 -Bolingbroke informed Torcy in March 1712 that "you will give us leave to be persuaded in Great Britain that a prince may depart from his right by a voluntary cession", i.e. that supposedly fundamental dynastic laws could in fact be overridden. He also made it clear that without the renunciation(s) demanded there would be no peace 15 . Louis XIV was brought to agree 16 , and Philip V -forced by his grandfather in May 1712 to choose between the thrones of France and Spain-opted (to the great surprise of the Sun King and others) to keep the latter.
This paved the way for queen Anne's declaration to Parliament in June 1712 17 , and that of Philip V to his ministers on 8 July 1712, that peace would be made on the basis of Philip's renunciation of his claim to the French throne. Philip explained, with some pride, that not one bit of the Spanish Indies were to be dismembered -the only cessions in the Americas were to be the conquests made there by the English at French (not Spanish) expense. Philip referred to the pressure that had been put on him to renounce the throne of Spain in order to secure his prospects of succeeding to that of France but emphasised that what had determined his final decision was his sense of gratitude to, and obligations towards the Spaniards, whose loyalty had secured his position in Spain on the two occasions when it had seemed to falter, a clear reference to the events of 1706 and 1710, when enemy forces had driven Philip from Madrid, and themselves briefly occupied his capital 18 . Significantly, however, Philip at this point made no mention of the role of the Cortes.
The value of a renunciation -"the great article" as Bolingbroke invariably termed it in the following months
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-was by no means widely acknowledged inside or outside Britain. On the contrary, there was a great deal of criticism of this solution, with reference specifically to the failure of the renunciation by the Infanta in 1659 to prevent an attempt by Louis XIV to put one of his descendants by her on the Spanish throne. Count Bothmar, representative in London of the Electress of Hanover, not only one of Britain's allies but also queen Anne's heir in Briain, submitted a memorial for queen Anne in December 1711 making just this point 20 . Hence the desire of British ministers to have Philip's renunciation given as much credibility and force as was possible by having it enacted or authorised in Spain in and by the assembled Cortes.
But just what did British ministers know of the Cortes? In Castile it had not formally assembled between the death of Philip IV in 1665 and the occasion in April 1709 when it been summoned to swear to the heir to the throne 21 . In all the years it had not met the Cortes had nonetheless played a role, suggesting the continued strength of certain "constitutional attitudes. Thus the fact that the millones revenues -among the king's most valuable -depended upon the consent of the Cortes voting towns for renewal every 6 years was respected throughout the decades after 1665, as was the need for the consent of those towns to breaches of the conditions of those earlier grants. At the same time, throughout the debates in Spain regarding the succession before 1700, there had been mention of the role the Cortes might play. The fact that the Cortes had met so recently (1709) and that -following the abolition of the Cortes of Aragon and Valencia in 1707-the Castilian Cortes on that occasion had included representatives from a limited number of Aragonese and Valencian towns may have suggested the credibility of this solution strengthening of the renunciation to queen Anne's ministers in 1711 22 . Whatever the precise knowledge or understanding in Britain of the constitutional situation in Philip V's Spain, preparations began on both sides for the formal renun- health. However, Lexington was a loyal Tory, and he had been on the Board of Trade (where he had opposed the Scots efforts to establish a colony at Darien in Spanish central America), which would might help him in the commercial negotiations which would take place once the renunciations were sanctioned by the Cortes. In any case, Philip also intended to send a representative, to negotiate in London with Bolingbroke, the marques of Monteleon
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. Lexington's instructions, dated 1 September 1712 directed him to proceed to Madrid, to witness the renunciation(s), and then to pursue a number of other matters -including the not only the negotiation of a trade treaty but also the cession of Sicily to the duke of Savoy and the fate of Britain's Catalan allies-and only then to assume the public character of ambassador (rather than merely envoy extraordinary), thus finally, officially recognising Philip as king of Spain , and the Queen of Great Britain who gives us peace". Lexington, who throughout his mission was to show himself very cautious and anxious to secure the approval for all he did from his superiors in London, hoped that Dartmouth would forgive his long account of his initial reception in Spain but thought he ought to be "very exact", in order to show the great joy of the Spaniards at the prospect of peace with England. In a letter written the same day to the Lord Treasurer (and de facto prime minister), Robert Harley, earl of Oxford, with whom he also corresponded throughout his mission, Lexington went as far as to speak of Spanish hopes of a release from French "slavery" 33 . In a subsequent letter to Dartmouth, Lexington added that the Captain General of Guipuzcoa had told him that a deputation from the province was an honour that "never was done to any body but the king himself", demonstrating "how overjoyed these people are at 34 . This desire on the part of Philip V's subjects for an end to the war clearly augured well for Lexington, who continued on to Madrid, via Tolosa and Vitoria. From Vitoria he wrote:
…the same honours continue to be done to me…and the magistrates of every town have orders to meet and conduct me through their several districts..All the English merchants of Bilbao met me here as did 2 deputies from the States of Biscay… they helped me to these 3 [enclosed] papers, the 1 st is a copy of a summons from the king to the town of Valladolid to send deputys to the Cortes, the 2 nd is the publication of the suspension of arms [concluded in Paris in August 1712], the last the publication of a free commerce with England,…
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From Vitoria, Lexington carried on via Burceguilla -from where he wrote to general Pearce, the senior British officer serving with the allied troops in Portugal, to inform him, at José Grimaldo's request, that queen Anne had agreed to a general suspension of arms 36 -arriving in Madrid on Tuesday 18 th October. He was met outside the town by the Duke of Popoli. Lexington later informed Dartmouth that the Duke was a Neapolitan and greatly concerned for himself and his relations in Sicily, and that throughout their journey to Madrid he "entertained" Lexington with nothing but arguments why England should not want Sicily to be in any hands but those of Spain for the benefit of its Mediterranean trade 37 . Philip, who according to Torcy had delayed the assembly of the Cortes (until the 20 th October) to ensure Lexington could attend 38 , and clearly anxious to settle matters, immediately summoned Lexington to an audience (of both the king and queen), and named don José Grimaldo and don Isidro de la Cueva y Benavides, marquis of Bedmar as his intermediaries, with the French-speaking Bedmar his principal commissary 39 . Within just a week of his arrival in Madrid, Lexington was able to send Dartmouth a copy of Philip's Renunciation and Oath, "which I have made to run the best I could in French" 40 . However, it was not all plain sailing. On 27 October 1712, clearly responding to a suggestion by Bedmar, Lexington opposed delaying Philip's renunciation in the Cortes until it had been registered by the parlement of Paris, and the French registration returned to Madrid, because he thought this would merely delay the conclusion of the peace 41 . In a second letter sent to Bedmar that same day, Lexington touched on what was to be a secondary aspect of his mission, but one which soon became one of the most contentious and time-consuming for him. This was the cession of the island of Sicily to Victor Amadeus II, duke of Savoy, which queen Anne and her ministers were very keen to press 42 . Lexington expressed concern at Philip V's wish to restrict the cession to Victor Amadeus, whereas queen Anne wanted unrestricted cession, not least because in the ongoing struggle between the queen Anne's Tory ministers and their allies over the peacemaking the Austrian Habsburgs and the Dutch were seeking to win Victor Amadeus to their position 43 . At the same time, Lexington insisted that he attend the opening of the Cortes; that the renunciation be published and registered in the council of state and other tribunals (i.e. councils); and that the Act of Renunciation specify the line of succession in the event of the failure of the male line of the Duke of Savoy 44 . Bedmar, or rather Philip yielded to Lexington's demands, clearly reflecting that desire on the part of Philip V and his subjects to end the war which Lexington had already been made aware of. The following day Bedmar informed the English envoy that although the king thought his renunciation should be declared in the Cortes at the same time as the French princes' renunciation of the Spanish realms, nevertheless, to demonstrate his good faith and his desire to conclude peace, Philip had fixed Saturday, 5
th November for the meeting of the Cortes and "the perfecting of this work according to your Excellency's desire" 45 . Lexington was making progress but remained uneasy. On the last day of October 1712 Lexington wrote to Dartmouth voicing his constant anxiety about whether his superiors in London approved his actions. It was not merely that "I treat with all the disadvantage that ever man did, for I am not master of Spanish and none of the Ministers understands anything else". Lexington had hoped, as he had been ordered in his instructions, to have not only Philip's renunciation of his claim on the French throne but also his cession of Gibraltar and the island of Menorca to Britain, and that of Sicily to Victor Amadeus formalised in the Cortes. However, Philip refused to agree to these further demands. In response to Lexington's request Philip's ministers deployed two arguments: firstly, that there was no need for the Cortes to play a part, since the king was "Master of yielding any part of his territorys as reasons of state shall require, and especially Sicily which was a Conquest, and thus not dependent upon Spain". This argument has important implications for the way Philip and his ministers understood the relationship between the different parts of the Monarchy and also suggests that Philip's assertion of a right of conquest was by no means limited to the Aragonese territories after 1707.
On another issue, too, Lexington was anxious. He hoped queen Anne would approve his demand that the rest of the male line of the House of Savoy be referred to 42 . Lexington also felt obliged to complain at the presence in Madrid of Tobias Bourke, the representative of the Jacobite pretender to queen Anne's crown, her half-brother, James Edward Stuart 47 . However, this issue was not allowed to get in the way of the main object of Lexington's mission, which took place on 5 November 1712 48 . The following day, the envoy informed Dartmouth that "yesterday the great Ceremony of the Renuntiation was performed with all the Solemnity imaginable and I was witness to it, according to my Instructions" 49 , and enclosed a copy of the renunciation in both the Spanish original and an English translation 50 . Two days after the ceremony Lexington sent a fuller account.
...on Saturday last the great Business of the Renunciation was past with all the formality and exactness imaginable; the night before I received a summons to be present from the secretary of State… at ten in the morning, where accordingly I was, as likewise the Envoy of france att my instance, all the Grandees then in Town were likewise summoned to be witnesses…, as was the Cardinal and the Patriarch of Spain and the Indies, the Queen was also present; then the K ordered the Act to be read by one of his Secretarys of the Council of State, then the King took the Oath administered to him by the Patriarch, and signed the Act. Att two in the afternoon the King went to the Cortes, whether I attended him, made a speech, and communicated to them what he had done for their approbation, which they are to give an answer to in 2 or 3 days, and then I will send the whole, with the exemplifications, as I was desired by Mylord Bolingbroke 51 .
The king's "Act" of 5 November was "passed, approved and confirmed" by the Cortes on 9 November 1712 52 , thus giving the Cortes a role in the peacemaking. Lexington had gained the main point. However, Philip still refused to agree to have the cession of Sicily to the Duke of Savoy confirmed by the Cortes, not only because it was a conquest, but also because "it was debasing of his authority too much to ask their consent and he had already agreed to it in my Demands". Lexington had yielded before the king's obstinacy on this point "because I was unwilling to put a stop to the great affair of the Renunciation" 53 . Lexington was now pressed by the Spanish Court to assume the character of ambassador, which would clearly be a propaganda coup for Philip, but he continued to put this off, until he heard from England, whether the response of the Spanish Court to his demands was approved 54 . In the meantime he sent copies of Philip's formal Renunciation (which he had received from Grimaldo) 55 to London and to Utrecht, "so that now that great work is over on this side, all but the confirmation of it by the council of castile", which Lexington intended to ensure was done in the appropriate form. He had also obtained an assurance that the Cortes should remain assembled until the Renunciation was registered in France, so that it could be confirmed by the Cortes thereafter. If Victor Amadeus insisted on having Sicily yielded to him by act of the Cortes, Lexington awaited orders to that effect from the Secretary of State but he was pessimistic about the likelihood of getting either Philip or the Cortes to grant it in such a manner.
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With the main issue resolved, Bedmar had already informed Lexington that in Philip V's opinion, Monteleon was sufficiently authorised to negotiate and conclude those points and articles which were still unresolved in Madrid and which had been effectively remitted to London for settlement, 58 implying perhaps that Lexington's mission was over. In fact, however, he remained in Madrid for another twelve months. Clearly, awaiting the renunciation(s) carried out in France (above) kept him in the Spanish capital. the negotiation of the promised trade treaty, in which work Lexington benefited from the assistance of Gilligan 61 . Progress, however, on all fronts was slow, too slow for Bolingbroke who in January 1713 insisted that the negotiations with Spain must be completed before the opening of another campaign, and before Parliament met again in early February 1713, thus putting an end to the great uncertainty, as to whether the war was really to be ended or was to continue. Bolingbroke also wanted Lexington to ensure that six 6 French ships which were said to be going to Spanish America be halted 62 . By the end of February 1713, the treaty of commerce was advancing, but its conclusion was now delayed by the fact that count Bergeyck, who "has the whole management of it", was preoccupied with his radical overhaul of the Spanish finances 63 . However, with the aid of the princess des Ursins, Lexington remained was confident of a very successful conclusion to these particular negotiations 64 . The cession of Sicily continued to preoccupy Lexington, who was effectively acting in Madrid on behalf of the Duke of Savoy. Victor Amadeus, having acknowledged "Charles III", and having sent a representative, the marquis de Trivié to the latter's Court at Barcelona (1707-11), had not yet made peace with Philip V or recognised him as king of Spain and had no official representative in Madrid of his own 65 . Not surprisingly, Victor Amadeus remained uncertain and anxious about the great prize of Sicily 66 . The Duke, reluctantly, agreed that the act of cession of Sicily did not have to be passed in the Cortes, and that it was sufficient for Philip to simply authorise it on his own authority until it was confirmed by a formal treaty with the Duke, whose provisions would also be copied into the treaty with queen Anne 67 . But there was still much to settle. In January 1713, Lexington passed on to the Spanish Court Victor Amadeus's requests that, along with the kingdom of Sicily, Philip cede the island's galleys, crews and equipment, that he also cede all official documents -titulos and so on-pertaining to the island, and that he formally recognise the duke as king of Sicily 68 . These issues were less problematic than was the Spanish Court's determination to have Sicily ceded to the Duke of Savoy as a fief (of the Spanish Crown), not least because -according to Lexington -Philip and his ministers knew that he could not deviate from his instructions and therefore pinned all their hopes of having the British ministers yield some ground on Monteleon's negotiations in London 69 . At the same time, Lexington was a means whereby Philip V communicated to British ministers his concern that the peace should provide for those of his allies in Italy and elsewhere whose loyalty had led to their dispossession, above all by the troops of the Emperor, who was rapidly emerging as the dominant power in Italy 70 . in January 1713 Grimaldo informed Lexington of Philip's orders to his plenipotentiaries at Utrecht to seek the full restoration in Italy of the prince of Castiglione, of the Duke of Mirandola, and -in the Empire-of the Elector of Bavaria 71 . But it was not only foreign sovereigns whose interests would be affected by the negotiations. So too were those of some of Philip's own subjects. Earlier, in December 1712 Philip had asked Lexington to request queen Anne to press in the congress at Utrecht that some provision be made for those who had states in Naples and other parts of Italy which were to be separated from Philip's dominions by the treaty of peace, Lexington transmitting to London a memorial and specific demands sent to the king by those concerned 72 . The extent to which subjects as well as sovereigns sought to have their interests taken care of in the peacemaking is an important one which has not always been fully appreciated in discussions of the peacemaking which have tended to focus on sovereigns and above all on the "Great Powers". The matterwitness the case of the princess des Ursins (below) -is not always clearcut. Nevertheless, there were clearly subjects who sought to put their concerns on the peacemaking agenda, in Spain as elsewhere. While in Madrid, Lexington received from Grimaldo and Bedmar memorials on behalf of both the duke of Veraguas, whose title to the island of Jamaica -seized by the English in 1655-had been infringed by the treaty of 1670 concluded between England and Spain, and who now hoped for redress, and the duke of Arcos, pressing the claims of the exiles from Portugal, loyal to the Habsburgs during Portugal's war of independence (1640-68) and whose restoration or compensation had not been properly resolved. According to Lexington, Bedmar, who also had a concern in the latter petition, was very deserving of help because he had been so helpful in all his dealings with the English representative 73 . The other big issue was that of the Catalans. This had by no means been neglected by Lexington on his first arrival 74 , but with the renunciation largely resolved by the end of 1712, the fate of the Catalans emerged as more of a priority. This was not least because of the refusal of the Spanish Court to listen to the representations of the British government on behalf of the Catalans. At the end of January 1713 Lexington represented the case of Catalans in two further audiences of Philip V and his queen, but they remained intransigent 75 . Indeed, in response to his efforts, both replied that if the King were to grant what Lexington sought, "il ne sera point Roy"
76 . In April 1713, following further representations by Lexington, who had received renewed orders to do this from London, Bedmar informed the envoy, with reference to article 15 of the recently concluded treaty, of "los justos motivos que concurren para negar los privilegios a los catalanes, cuya concesion seria muy perjuicial a la misma quietud de la monarchia de espana "Bedmar therefore expressed the hope that the queen would desist from pressing the Catalan issue, "mayormente teniendose constante maxima en que SMB se halla de que en estos tratados de pazes quede establecida y vinculada la tranquilidad de la Europa en general y la quietud y seguridad de cada Potencia en particular"
77 . This suggests an attempt to garner sympathy from queen Anne and her ministers among for Philip's position on the Catalan issue by associating it with the maintenance of authority, order and stability everywhere, including -implicitly-in Britain itself where the Jacobite issue remained a source of division.
Other issues were not lost sight of. Lexington was also mediating between the Courts of Madrid and Lisbon, securing at Portuguese request an extension of the cessation of arms in early 1713
78 . Nor was the great business of the renunciationsthe heart of Lexington's mission -finished with. At the start of March 1713 Lexington received from Grimaldo a copy of the formal renunciations made in France, which were to be registered in the Cortes 79 . However, Lexington found them defective, asking Grimaldo to request from Philip V orders to the king's representative in France to work with queen Anne's ambassador there, the duke of Shrewsbury to have the defect corrected 80 . Finally, all was resolved. 81 The asiento -the contract to supply African slaves to Spanish America for thirty years, awarded to Britain-was signed by Philip on 26 March 1713, and a preliminary, or draft peace treaty between Philip and queen Anne concluded by Lexington and Bedmar the following day 82 . At a number of points in the draft treaty, the text revealed that Lexington was unhappy that the content of that document did not reflect his instructions, and in 75 Letter from Lexington to Dartmouth, Madrid, 6 Feb. 1713 NS, NA, SP, 94, vol. 80. Bergeyck and Bedmar even refused to pass on to Philip the arguments Lexington had urged on them in a meeting lasting three hours, because -they said -the king was so opposed to the idea that they did not even want to broach it with him, extract of a letter from Lexington to Dartmouth, Madrid, 6 Feb. 1713 sending it to London, his usual anxiety was evident. Two things in particular concerned him, the provisions relating to the exercise of religion in the territories ceded to Britain (Menorca and Gibraltar) 83 and the commitment to the princesse des Ursins, i.e. to secure for her a sovereignty in former Spanish Flanders -and specifically the duchy of Limburg-with an annual revenue of 30,000 escudos. Lexington had sought to limit Britain's obligations towards Ursins but Maria Luisa had insisted on a fuller commitment (as earlier agreed by Lexington with Bedmar and Bergeyck) 84 . Lexington sought to justify hs draft treaty by explaining that this was the price he had been obliged to pay for the commercial and other advantages gained, not least because of the enormous importance of securing the support of Ursins (above), whose favour he feared he had lost by quibbling about the article in her favour and who, he declared, "has lived long enough in Italy not to forgive what she may think an injury". Lexington also began to complain both about his financial situation -being owed half a year's salary 85 -and his health, all adding up to a desire to be recalled and to leave Spain, " for I do protest that I have had neither pleasure, profit, nor health since I have set foot in Spain"
86 . Lexington was right to be concerned. British ministers in London and elsewhere found much to object to in to the religious and the commercial provisions of his draft treaty, which was subsequently renegotiated by Bolingbroke and Monteleon in London 87 . That too might have been thought to signal the end of Lexington's mission to Madrid, with business largely concluded. Indeed, at the end of March Lexington's secretary, Burch wrote to Dartmouth's secretary apologising for not writing to him before; he attributed his silence to "the incapacity of this damn'd country of producing any thing worth your notice"
88 . However, Lexington remained in Madrid for another six months. For one thing, the formalities respecting the various renunciations still had to be completed. In late April 1713 Philip V agreed to have the renunciations registered by the parlement of Paris -i.e. those of the dukes of Berry and Orleans-registered in the Cortes and had given the necessary orders for their insertion into the formal records of the latter. In
early May Grimaldo sent Lexington certification "de haverse visto y compulsado en los Libros del Reyno junto en Cortes las Letras Patentes y Actos del Parlamento de Paris"
89 . The execution of the asiento and the negotiation of a trade treaty also detained Lexington in Madrid. At the start of May, when congratulating Oxford on the conclusion of the peace (i.e. the various treaties concluded in March and April) at Utrecht, he informed him that he had sent Dartmouth papers needed for the Asiento, but again requested his own recall -"for God's sake get me leave to come home, and save my life-and again asked for money 90 . Later that same month, he reported that Philip's renunciation and that part of it which called the Duke of Savoy to the succession of Spain was proclaimed in Madrid "with kettle drums and trumpets" as a fundamental law 91 . Thereafter, Lexington was kept busy pressing the Spanish Court to ratify the agreement concluded in London in May by Bolingbroke and Monteleon. 92 Lexington also received orders to insist on Philip's surrender of Sacramento to the Portuguese. Unfortunately for Lexington, however, he claimed not to know where Sacramento was, but he also thought nonetheless that the order contravened his original instructions from Bolingbroke "que la reine empechera tout demembrement ulterieur de la Monarchie Espagnole"
93 . In any event, Philip refused to give way over both the colony 94 , and the Portuguese "barrier" 95 . In early July, following further prompting by Lexington, he was informed by Grimaldo that the deal concluded by Bolingbroke and Monteleon had finally been ratified by Philip V, "con la circunstancia de que en consequencia de lo ofrecido y palabra dada por SMB se haya de poner en posesion de la soberania del Ducado de Limbourg a la senora Prinzesa de los Ursinos antes de entregarse los estados de Flandes al Archiduque". Indeed, in view of the hostility of the Court of Vienna to the cession of any territory in Flanders, the Spanish Court was suggesting that queen Anne should hand over to Ursins some of the garrisoned towns her forces occupied there on the Emperor's behalf 96 . However, this was not allowed to delay the conclusion at last of the Anglo-Spanish peace treaty in Utrecht on 13 July 1713 (above). On the same day a preliminary trade treaty between England and Spain was concluded in Madrid 97 . But the cession of Sicily continued to preoccupy Lexington, not least because Philip V attached a number of conditions to its surrender to the duke of Savoy. These were by no means acceptable to Victor Amadeus 98 , who thought that Philip's stipulation that employments remain in the same hands was designed to keep up an interest for the crown of Spain by having so many creatures in the kingdom 99 . Thereafter, the Duke's anxieties were exacerbated by the efforts of the Spanish Court to make the evacuation and cession of Sicily conditional on the prior evacuation of Catalonia by the Imperial troops 100 . Clearly, Philip and his ministers were seeking to exploit whatever diplomatic advantages they had; equally clearly Philip was reluctant to surrender Sicily -all that was left of Spanish Italy (apart from the remnant of the Tuscan presidios) 101 -an early indication of what would be one of the main preoccupations of the Spanish Court after 1713, the rebuilding of Spanish Italy. Matters thereafter were complicated by the efforts of the Genoese republic to purchase Finale in Liguria from the Emperor. Finale, a crucial embarcation and landing point in the past for troops passing between Milan and other parts of the Monarchy, was another of the prizes made available by the dissolution of that Monarchy. Victor Amadeus would have liked it for himself (possibly as an equivalent for the Milanese territories promised him by the Emperor in 1703 but which was a source of great difficulties between the Courts of Vienna and Turin), since it offered a shorter route from Turin to the sea (and onward to Sicily). The Duke of Savoy urged Lexington to mobilise the Spanish Court to object to a deal which would supply the Emperor with money for the continuation of the war, arguing -more Spanish than the Spaniards-that the Emperor had no right to dispose of, i.e. sell -what belonged to the Spanish Monarchy before it was given up by Philip 102 . But there remained the question of Sicily. In July 1713 Philip's plenipotentiaries concluded with those of the duke of Savoy at Utrecht a peace treaty which confirmed the duke and house of Savoy's place in the line of Spanish succession and included Philip's formal cession of the island of 103 . However, Philip objected to so many provisions of the treaty regarding the cession that he sent back to Utrecht a ratification not of the treaty which had been sent to Madrid but of a completely new one which included the conditions objected to by the duke of Savoy 104 . In August 1713, Lexington informed Bolingbroke (who had just replaced Dartmouth as Secretary of State for the South) that "Your Lrdship will be much surprised .that instead of the Duke of Savoy's treaty signed at Utrecht they have formed another, ratified it and sent it to Utrecht and never communicated a word of it" to Lexington himself until 10 o'clock on the night before they sent it. This meant that he had had no time to have it changed, although he had made representations, saying the Duke of Savoy would not ratify, that queen Anne would not like it, that disavowing their plenipotentiaries meant that none would treat with the Spanish Court in future, and that they still had war on their hands in many parts. However, having sought to convince the Spanish Court that it had erred in sending the revised treaty, Lexington advised Victor Amadeus to make the best of a bad job and accept it 105 . This episode was an opportunity for Lexington to vent his spleen regarding the Spanish Court, with which he had been dealing with now for nine months. He noted, "you must know the Constitution of this Court is to will one thing in the morning…. and if you stay till next morning you will have a fourth, so that the best way is to close with them immediately if you can get the essential". He added, in a rather startling conclusion that the "people here [are] near to revolution"
106 , but without explaining why or what his evidence for this remarkable claim was.
That same month, August 1713, Lexington received his long desired letter of revocation. However, he would not use it until he had assumed the character of ambassador, which he could not do until the exchange of ratifications of the treaty concluded at Utrecht on 31 July 1713. This also gave him some leverage in his efforts to secure funds from London, to pay for his formal, ceremonial entry into Madrid. Lexington intended to remain in Madrid until he heard from the Duke of Savoy regarding the treaty for Sicily. But anticipating his imminent departure, Lexington urged that his successor be sent as soon as possible, and that he should be a bold man but also one with a great deal of patience and "temper" and "versed in business"
107 . Expecting to leave Madrid in the near future, Lexington also seized an opportunities to visit -and admire-the palace monastery of the Escorial in August 1713 108 . However, there was still business to be done, not least the implementation of the agreements concluded so far and the negotiation of the trade treaty. In early August 1713 Grimaldo informed Lexington that, although Philip wished to satisfy the British monarch, it was impossible to change -as Lexington had requested -what had been laid down in article 11 of the peace treaty, restricting trade by the moors in and with the island of Menorca, At the same time, Lexington monitored the Spanish Court's performance of its treaty and other obligations. In September 1713 for example he commented on Spanish efforts to obstruct the supply of the British garrison in Gibraltar 110 . That same month he brought to Bedmar's and Philip V's attention that the French continued to trade in the Spanish Indies despite the Spanish Court's promise to put an end to this in the peace agreement. Bedmar informed the envoy that Philip ad resolved to inform the Council of the Indies, so that it would propose a remedy to this "disorder"
111 . In September, too, Lexington reported that the Pope had written to the Catholic King, following reports he had received from the bishop of Mallorca about frequent infractions of ecclesiastical jurisdiction on the island of Menorca by its new overlords, the English 112 . However, Lexington's mission was now overtaken by a major personal tragedy when on 22 September 1713, Lexington's eldest son, William, who had accompanied him to Madrid, fell ill of a violent fever and within ten days was dead, aged just 15. Lexington, not surprisingly was devastated 113 . Just over a week later, on Wednesday, 11 October 1713, Lexington finally had his audience of Philip V, giving in both his credentials (about which there had been some difficulty raised by the Spanish Court, before they were finally accepted and Lexington given his audience) 114 and his recredentials. Lexington, finding him self continually ill in Madrid hoped queen Anne would allow him, as soon as his strength permitted, to leave Madrid. He had already removed to another house following his son's death, his secretary declaring that "we are all in utmost confusion at present 115 . Indeed, the quality of Lexington's performance of his duties may have suffered from his poor health (exacerbated by grief?). In late October, he informed Bolingbroke that the latter's recent letter (of 1 September) had found Lexington ill and in bed, to which he had been confined for nine or ten weeks. Lexington blamed his illness for his having mangled a translation of a letter of Bolingbroke's, and sought to mitigating his offence by suggesting that the translation he had submitted to the Spanish ministers seemed to have worked anyway, since the earl of Strafford, one of the British plenipotentiaries at Utrecht had reported an improvement in the attitude of the Spanish negotiators there 116 .
Clearly, there was still business to transact, some of it the continuation of measures dating from Lexington's first arrival in Spain. As soon as he reached Spain in October 1712, Lexington received statements of their grievances from English merchants there. From Bilbao, for example he received this: we have this day writ Yr Ex under cover of [the] agent in Madrid of this Senorio, town and Contratacion House touching the inquisition made about the introduction of goods liable to pay the indulto of 7%… 117 . After years of war there was also a need to reconstruct the network of consuls. At the start of October 1712, Philip V had returned to Lexington 3 patents for consuls which Lexington had issued, those for Alicante and Cartagena and that for Cadiz and Pto de Sa Maria, the provisions of which represented an innovation on the practice and form of the reigns of both Charles II and Philip V -an interesting commentary on the extent to which Philip was seeking to emphasise the continuities between his own government and that of his Habsburg predecessor-because this jurisdiction resided in juezes conservadores appointed by the king 118 . However, the following month Philip was happy to issue patents for English consuls to act in the ports of Cadiz and Pontevedra during the suspension of arms 119 . Consular issues continued to exercise envoy and ministers. Later that same month, November 1712, Bedmar informed Lexington, following the envoy's nomination of one Gilberto Apton as consul of the English nation in San Lucar, Seville and parte del condado [de Niebla?] , that the king objected that there was no example of -precedent for-the existence of a principal consul in the parts referred to by Lexington, but only in Cadiz, whose consuls named vice-consuls (subject to the king's confimationl) at their own risk and who didn't in fact reside in those other ports for which they acted as vice-consul 120 . The newly active consul at Alicante, Nicholas Herne, continued to alert Lexington to the grievances of English merchants there, and reporting the harmful impact of the Nueva Planta. In February 1713, Herne, acknowledging receipt of the despatch for him to act as consul had various complaints. Firstly, there was the conduct of the governor of Alicante who was claiming 2%, as commissary of contraband. In addition, "this province being made as Castilla there is introduced which never was before a stanke [sic] or farm of tobacco and none suffered to deal in any but the farmer who buys at the price he pleases" which Herne feared would damage the Virginia trade with Alicante and -In consequence-"[our] shipping". But there was more. Herne also lamented some new customs impositions, to the prejudice of the sale of English goods: formerly -he claimed-the customs did not arise to above 7.5 or 8% but now they would total 15% more or less 121 . Herne continued to complain to Lexington, at the same time supplying him with useful intelligence for onward transmission to London. Later that same month he reported that the Governor of Alicante had written to the council of War to know how to deal with English ships with passports from Mahon and Gibraltar, not least because the Genoese were apparently using the English presence as a cover for their own (illicit) trade 122 . Later, in September 1713, Herne informed Lexington of new impositions at Alicante on trade, claiming that "Such encroachments …plainly manifests the unquiet and unsatisfyed humour of our [Spanish] Govt and the little regard the Court has for commerce and [which] will by degrees make us so uneasy that none can trade 123 . The following month, October 1712, while condoling with Lexington on the death of his son, Herne took the opportunity to make further complaints against the Governor: he feared the Governor might billet some of the troops returning from Sicily in the homes of the British merchants, pointing out that the French (shopkeepers and merchants) had nearly 100 houses in Alicante -more than the English. He also feared that the English merchant community might be asked to contribute towards a donative towards the cost of the war in Catalonia 124 . But there were other issues as well. That same month, Lexington had to deal with another case -one of many-of a seized English ship, which Philip had referred (as were all prize cases) to the Council of War 125 . But Lexington also had to deal with complaints from the Spanish Court, for example that English ships bought salt in Ibiza which they then sold at Genoa for sale and whose proceeds encouraged Ibiza in resisting Philip V 126 . Finally, Lexington also sought to support Gilligan's effort to secure mercedes for friends and others in Madrid. In November 1713, Grimaldo explained to Lexington that he would have liked to serve Da. Rosa Enrriquez y Onel, in her pursuit of encomienda de Indios in New Spain, to please Gilligan, but that it was not possible, Philip having refused her twice already, on the grounds that he did not grant them to other than the most deserving subjects, [i.e] the descendants of Conquistadores de las Indies 127 . Lexington finally left Madrid on 28 Nov. 1713. He wrote to the Catalans with the agreement of Philip V before he departed, urging them to submit to Philip on the terms agreed for them at Utrecht in July since there was nothing more to be done 128 . The trade treaty was still not concluded, but would be the following month. Lexington headed for Lisbon, hoping to take ship there for home 129 , and leaving Burch in charge in Madrid 130 . Lexington travelled via Talavera de la Reyna 131 and Bada-joz, which he left on 14 December, expecting to be in Lisbon within 6 days 132 . He continued to correspond with Burch, who received a letter from him from Aldea Galleaga (Lisbon), saying that at Merida he had had another relapse. Burch himself intended to leave Madrid once the treaty of commerce was concluded 133 . Lexington was by no means free of Spain and its concerns back in England. In the summer of 1714 he received a letter from the princesse des Ursins (in reply to one from him). She was still pursuing her sovereignty in the Low Countries, an obligation on the British monarch in the form of one of the secret articles of the peace treaty concluded on 31 July 1713
134
. Ursins now affected a desire to retire from the inconstant world (to repose in her sovereignty), Ursins explained -or rather claimed-that she had only failed to push her own interests-the sovereignty-because to have done so would have prevented Philip from reducing Catalonia. Philip, she said, had refused to make peace with the Dutch before until Ursins was put into possession of her sovereignty, but Louis XIV having promised the States-General to have Philip make peace, he had told the latter that he would not send troops to Catalonia unless the king settled. Knowing Philip's need to reduce Catalonia to obedience, Ursins informed Lexington that she had redoubled her efforts with him to make peace with Holland, so as not to be the cause of delay, and Philip had agreed, ordering his ambassadors at Utrecht to conclude peace without mentioning her sovereignty. But Philip, she declared, still hoped that queen Anne would fulfil her commitment to Ursins, "et j'oze dire milord que ce grand prince [Philip] sera encore plus sensible que moy a ce que fera la Reyne Britannique en ma faveur" 135 . Unfortunately for Ursins, queen Anne was soon to die, in August 1714, and the new Hanoverian regime of George I far from wishing to complete the business of peacemaking begun in 1711 was determined to pursue those it held responsible for a betrayal of British and allied interests (and the Catalans). Lexington was not formally condemned by the committee of secrecy chaired by sir Robert Walpole which investigated the peacemaking of 1711-13, or subsequently impeached, as were Oxford, Bolingbroke, Thomas Wentworth, earl of Stafford (principal British plenipotentiary at Utrecht) and James Butler, duke of Ormonde (commander of the British forces in Flanders during the peacemaking) 136 , but he disappeared from public life, until his death in 1723. Despite the boast on Lexington's tomb, one of the few enduring monuments -lieu de memoire-to the peacemaking of 1713, he had not played a key role in the peacemaking -indeed his selection to go to Madrid remains a puzzle, one confirmed by his disappointing performance there. He had failed to seize the opportunity that Bolingbroke had declared was his in January 1713 (above), his draft treaty having to be corrected by Bolingbroke in negotiation with Monteleon in London. Lexington's failure owed something no doubt to his persistent ill health. But it also suggests that while Philip V and his subjects were eager -even desperate-for peace, the king and his ministers had some room for manoeuvre in view of the prizes others -queen Anne's ministers, the duke of Savoy-sought to secure from the great Spanish Monarchy, and that both recognised that they had that room and ably exploited it. Their exploitation of their opportunities also emphasises the need not to be mesmerised by the negotiations going on in Utrecht, that there were other venues for diplomacy -Madrid, London-and that Philip was by no means simply to be manipulated by his grandfather, Louis XIV. Besides being a disappointing negotiator, Lexington was also a disappointing observer -for the historian-of the Spain of Philip V as it emerged from the War of the Spanish Succession. In some respects his time in Madrid was as unhappy as that of Alexander Stanhope, though for different reasons. Nevertheless, Lexington's negotiations in Spain, and his reports from there, offer some invaluable glimpses of attitudes in Spain -of monarch, ministers and subjects-regarding the peacemaking in 1712-13. They also suggest that, although not to be compared with the role of Parliament in British peacemaking, the Spanish Cortes -admittedly at foreign insistence-had played a part in the settlement which brought the war to a close.
